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GRAHAM V. FLORIDA:  
A GAME-CHANGING VICTORY  
FOR BOTH JUVENILES AND  
JUVENILE-RIGHTS ADVOCATES 
Michelle Marquis* 
In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Constitution—specifically, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment—prohibits the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide. 
Graham marks a significant departure from the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence because it categorically bars life sentences 
for juveniles who are convicted of nonhomicide crimes based on 
juveniles’ unique amenability to rehabilitation, rather than on the 
nature of the punishment itself. While Graham’s central holding is 
ostensibly straightforward, the decision has generated more questions 
than answers. Courts have split on whether Graham applies to term of 
years sentences that are materially indistinguishable from life without 
parole. They have also split on whether the decision’s reasoning 
supports an invalidation of life without parole sentences for juveniles 
who are convicted under felony-murder and accomplice-liability 
theories of criminal liability. Furthermore, the legislative response to 
Graham has been protracted, and critics continue to question the 
effectiveness of using state parole boards as the primary mechanism for 
compliance with Graham given that parole systems are structured to 
make any opportunity for release virtually unattainable. Despite this 
uncertainty, Graham has transformative potential in the area of juvenile 
rights, and advocates should use it to push for additional reform that, 
until recently, had no solid foundation in Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Business Administration, 
2006, University of San Diego. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor 
Maureen Pacheco for her invaluable support and guidance on this Note. I would also like to thank 
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review—particularly Jolene Tanner and 
Joshua Rich—for their hard work and diligent effort in preparing this Note for publication. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The original goal of the juvenile justice system was to benefit 
and rehabilitate adolescent offenders.1 The establishment of separate 
juvenile courts was premised on the general belief that “the normal 
adolescent experience is characterized by experimentation and risky 
behavior”2 and the idea that adolescents are “more amenable to 
rehabilitation as compared to adults.”3 In other words, there was a 
clear understanding that “children are different from adults and 
therefore needed to be treated differently.”4 However, as Patricia L. 
West, head of the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, stated, 
“The thinking behind the juvenile court, that everything be done in 
the best interest of the child, is from a bygone era.”5 
The current systems that exist in California and across the nation 
have abandoned these rehabilitative objectives. American criminal 
law no longer reflects the view that children are less culpable and in 
greater need of protection than adults are.6 As Peter Elikann, author 
of Superpredators: The Demonization of Our Children by the Law, 
has pointed out, severe punishments for juveniles are now “in 
vogue.”7 The elimination of juvenile courts and facilities has become 
increasingly common; as a result, juveniles are tried as adults and 
sentenced to lengthy incarceration in adult facilities.8 For the most 
serious offenses, courts have not hesitated to impose the most serious 
penalties. Until the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Roper v. Simmons,9 which categorically prohibited the execution of 
 
 1. Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About Getting Tough: 
Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1303 
(1996). 
 2. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. 
REV. 99, 106 (2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE 
LAW 123 (Insight Books, 1999). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Scott Hechinger, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-
Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 462–63 (2011). 
 7. ELIKANN, supra note 4, at 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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juveniles, the death penalty was the most severe sentence available 
for juveniles. 
Following Roper, life without the possibility of parole replaced 
execution as the toughest sentence that states could constitutionally 
impose on juveniles.10 Many thought that the Court’s ruling in Roper 
was restricted to the death penalty because “death is different.”11 The 
other faction countered that the message of Roper was that “kids are 
different” and that this decision set the stage for a constitutional 
challenge to juvenile life without parole (JLWOP)—a sentence that, 
not unlike the death penalty, imposes a “terminal, unchangeable, 
once-and-for-all judgment upon the whole life of a human being and 
declares that human being forever unfit to be a part of civil 
society.”12 
In May 2010, five years after Roper, the Court in Graham v. 
Florida13 barred the imposition of life without parole on juveniles 
who are convicted of nonhomicide offenses that they committed 
before they turned eighteen.14 In rendering its decision, the Court 
emphasized the diminished culpability of juveniles, which reaffirmed 
the central foundation laid in Roper.15 
Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Roper and Graham 
have led many advocates to intimate that the Court is prepared to 
respond to the problem of serious and violent juvenile crime in a 
developmentally appropriate manner. In both decisions, the Court 
relied on a broad body of research that supported the proposition that 
children are “cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally different 
from adults in ways that make a sentence of life without parole 
entirely inappropriate for [juveniles].”16 
Graham’s basic holding forbids states from sentencing juveniles 
to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.17 Instead, youths 
must be provided a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
 
 10. See Hechinger, supra note 6, at 415–17. 
 11. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-
7621). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 2026–28. 
 16. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/jj_jlwopfactsheetJuly2010.pdf. 
 17. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
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on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”18 Legislatures are 
prohibited from making a “once-and-for-all determination of [a 
juvenile] offender’s capacity to change . . . at the onset of a 
sentence.”19 
Given our current knowledge of the psychological development 
of adolescents, we know that it is impossible to make such a 
determination with any accuracy at the time of sentencing.20 When 
dealing with juveniles in particular, “there is always the possibility of 
growth and improvement with maturation, and dramatic response to 
intervention.”21 For this reason, Graham is arguably the most 
important Supreme Court decision to address the rights of juveniles. 
The reasoning of the decision supports the proposition that courts 
should always consider the diminished culpability of juveniles when 
deciding on appropriate punishments. 
In order to fully appreciate the impact of this decision, one must 
delve into the history of the juvenile justice system and examine the 
reasons behind its recent shift away from rehabilitation toward 
punishment and incapacitation. To that end, Part II traces the history 
of the juvenile justice system, from the creation of the first juvenile 
courts through today. Then, Part III provides an overview of the 
Court’s analysis in Roper, and Part IV analyzes the Court’s extension 
of that reasoning beyond the context of the death penalty in Graham. 
The next two sections examine the implications of the decision: Part 
V sets forth what is clear after Graham, while Part VI underscores 
several areas of uncertainty that remain. Finally, Part VII examines 
the use of parole boards as a mechanism for state compliance with 
Graham. 
 
 18. Id. at 2034. 
 19. Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving 
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 94 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/smithcohen.pdf. 
 20. Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n, American Psychiatric Ass’n, National 
Ass’n of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621). 
 21. Gregory K. Fritz, Juveniles with Life but Not Parole, THE PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., 
Aug. 19, 2010, at 7. 
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II.  THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:  
THEN AND NOW 
A.  The Creation of  
Separate Juvenile Courts 
At its infancy, the United States did not have separate 
adjudicatory proceedings for children accused of criminal behavior.22 
As a result, children were tried as adults and sentenced to adult 
prisons upon conviction.23 Social reformers were “dismayed by a 
system that permitted children to be confined alongside adult 
offenders . . . [and] objected to the punitive nature of the adult 
system and sentencing as it applied to juveniles.”24 These reformers 
advocated for a separate system that reflected “children’s potential 
for rehabilitation in its response to their criminal behavior.”25 
The first juvenile court was established in 1899; by 1917, nearly 
every state had statutorily established separate courts for juvenile 
offenders.26 Initially, juvenile delinquency proceedings were 
considered “civil,” which distinguished them from adult criminal 
proceedings.27 As such, juveniles were not afforded the same 
procedural protections as adults had.28 In the early years, legal 
practitioners widely accepted that the procedural safeguards afforded 
 
 22. Gail B. Goodman, Comment, Arrested Development: An Alternative to Juveniles Serving 
Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2007); see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR 
CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2005) [hereinafter HRW THE REST OF THEIR 
LIVES] (noting that child offenders aged fifteen and over were charged and tried in adult courts in 
early U.S. history). 
 23. Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders Are Treated 
as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 127 (2004). 
 24. Goodman, supra note 22, at 1064 (discussing the objections of reformers). 
 25. HRW THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 22, at 14 (discussing the arguments made 
by children’s welfare advocates). 
 26. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9–10 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
 27. Goodman, supra note 22, at 1067; see also R. BARRI FLOWERS, KIDS WHO COMMIT 
ADULT CRIMES: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY BY JUVENILE OFFENDERS 152 (Nathanial J. Pallone ed., 
2002) (discussing differences between proceedings and philosophy in juvenile court and those in 
adult court). 
 28. Goodman, supra note 22, at 1067. Specifically, juveniles were not entitled to the 
procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. 
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to adults in criminal proceedings were “neither necessary nor 
helpful” to the juvenile process.29 
B.  Juvenile Adjudications  
Begin to Mirror  
Adult Criminal Proceedings 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided several important cases requiring that 
juveniles be provided with procedural protections comparable to 
those that were required in adult criminal proceedings.30 As the 
procedures of the juvenile justice system started to mirror those of 
the adult criminal system, the proceedings became more adversarial 
in nature, which inevitably led to a shift in the focus of the system as 
a whole.31 
Neelum Arya, Policy Director for the Campaign for Youth 
Justice, notes that many scholars suggest that the Supreme Court 
victories that resulted in new constitutional protections for juveniles 
“actually helped create the political environment responsible for the 
punitive criminal justice policies of the 1970s and beyond.”32 
Adjudications were no longer focused on the goals of educating 
juvenile offenders, reducing recidivism, and promoting positive 
societal values; instead, the focus shifted toward incapacitation, 
deterrence, and retribution.33 
C.  The Legislative Response to  
the Juvenile “Super-Predator” 
Another factor that played a significant role in this policy shift 
occurred during the mid-1980s, when there was a perceived34 
 
 29. Id. at 1067 n.51 (citing Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 66 MONT. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2005)). 
 30. Goodman, supra note 22, at 1067. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 
(1970) (holding that juveniles are entitled to the procedural safeguard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 35–41 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles juveniles to the same 
procedural protections as adults). 
 31. Goodman, supra note 22, at 1070. 
 32. Arya, supra note 2, at 101. 
 33. Id. at 125–28; Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without 
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 685–86 (1998). 
 34. See Laureen D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile 
Offenders Is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 277 (1997) (discussing the 
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increase in violent juvenile crime.35 According to the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “[e]xtensive media 
coverage of violent crimes . . . fueled perceptions that violence 
committed by juveniles . . . reached epidemic proportions and that no 
community [was] immune to random violent acts committed by 
young people.”36 As a result, “the climate in the United States . . . 
became one of fear and retribution when it came to juvenile crime.”37 
In 1996, political scientists William J. Bennett, John J. DiIulio, Jr., 
and John P. Walters published Body Count Moral Poverty . . . And 
How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs, a widely read 
and extremely influential book that was premised on the idea that 
America’s youth had become devoid of morality.38 
America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile 
“super-predators”—radically impulsive, brutally 
remorseless youngsters, including ever more preteenage 
boys, who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal 
deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create serious 
communal disorders. They do not fear the stigma of arrest, 
the pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience.39 
Driven by the public’s fears about these juvenile “super-
predators,” politicians passed legislation that “significantly altered 
the legal response to violent and other serious crimes.”40 Through 
such legislation, “[s]tates embraced harsher criminal justice policies 
for children just as they did for adults, without stopping to ascertain 
whether or not they would prove effective.”41 Underlying many of 
 
“misguided perception” that violent juvenile crime is increasing, despite statistical evidence to the 
contrary). 
 35. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARREST 
RATES BY OFFENSE, SEX, AND RACE (1980–2008) (2009), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
ojstatbb/dat.html (downloadable spreadsheet). 
 36. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE 
CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 1 (1996). 
 37. Fritz, supra note 21. 
 38. Liliana Segura, Ugly Truth: Most U.S. Kids Sentenced to Die in Prison Are Black, 
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/ 
index.php?context=va&aid=16034. 
 39. WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN 
AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996). 
 40. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 36, at xi. 
 41. HRW THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 22, at 15; see, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra 
note 36, at xi. Examples of the legislative response include, but are not limited to, the removal of 
more serious and violent juvenile offenders from juvenile courts to adult courts, the revision of 
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these legislative changes was the innate belief that “serious and 
violent juvenile offenders must be held accountable for their 
actions.”42 Whereas the traditional approach of the juvenile justice 
system emphasized the importance of offender-based dispositions, 
focusing on the individual needs of the offender as well as on his or 
her future welfare, the new offense-based approach had two main 
goals: punishment and incapacitation.43 
D.  “Adult Crime, Adult Time”  
Statutes and Legislative  
Proliferation of Transfer Laws 
In direct response to the public’s fear of juvenile “super-
predators,” legislatures across the country enacted “adult crime, adult 
time” statutes, which included provisions that facilitated the 
automatic transfer of juveniles from juvenile court to adult court.44 
Such statutes also resulted in harsher sentences, including life 
without parole for certain violent offenses.45 
By 1997, nearly every state had altered its laws to facilitate the 
transfer of juvenile offenders into adult court.46 Three mechanisms 
used to facilitate the adult trial and sentencing of juvenile offenders 
are the withdrawal of juvenile jurisdiction, the use of prosecutorial 
discretion to direct file, and the lowering of the age for adult court 
jurisdiction.47 Originally, transfers were infrequent and only occurred 
when the transfer would serve the “best interests” of the juvenile.48 
Today, “all states and the federal government have the capacity to try 
 
confidentiality provisions in favor of more open proceedings and records, and the inclusion of 
victims of juvenile crime as active participants in the juvenile justice process. TORBET ET AL., 
supra note 36, at xi. 
 42. TORBET ET AL., supra note 36, at xi. 
 43. Id. at 11. 
 44. David L. Hudson Jr., Adult Time for Adult Crimes: Is Life Without Parole 
Unconstitutional for Juveniles?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2009, at 16, 16. 
 45. Id. 
 46. HRW THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 22, at 16–17. 
 47. Id. at 17. “Withdrawal legislation” is legislation that precludes a juvenile court from 
exercising jurisdiction over certain cases (e.g., a homicide committed by a fifteen-year-old). Id. 
Direct file legislation permits the prosecutor to file charges against child offenders in adult court 
rather than in juvenile court for certain offenses. Id. Legislation lowering the age for adult-court 
jurisdiction lowers the age at which juvenile offenders are subject to adult-court jurisdiction. Id. 
 48. See Arya, supra note 2, at 106–07 (describing the purpose of the American juvenile 
justice system and its changing nature). 
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certain youths as adults in criminal court.”49 In fact, each year an 
estimated 200,000 juveniles are “prosecuted, sentenced, or 
incarcerated as adults . . . instead of being adjudicated in the juvenile 
justice system.”50 This number represents a more than 80 percent 
increase over that in the past generation and exemplifies the routine 
nature of this practice.51 
E.  Transfer Laws and the  
Availability of Life  
Without Parole for Juveniles 
A JLWOP sentence “becomes available once juveniles are 
transferred to the adult system.”52 Depending on applicable state law, 
this transfer can occur either mandatorily or discretionarily.53 After a 
juvenile’s case has been transferred to adult court, life without parole 
may be imposed either as a mandatory sentence for certain crimes 
(e.g., homicide) or as a result of judicial discretion.54 As applied to 
juveniles, the imposition of life without parole “effectively reject[s] 
the well-established principle of criminal justice that children are less 
culpable than adults for crimes they commit.”55 
III.  ROPER V. SIMMONS 
Five years before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Graham v. Florida,56 the Court in Roper addressed the 
constitutionality of capital punishment as applied to juvenile 
offenders.57 There, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the 
age of eighteen at the time that they committed the offense.58 In 
 
 49. HRW THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 22, at 17. 
 50. Arya, supra note 2, at 108. 
 51. Martin Guggenheim, Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, but Don’t 
Expect Any Miracles, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 53 (2006). 
 52. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 1. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. HRW THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 22, at 3. 
 56. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 57. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2002). 
 58. Id. at 578; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded because their diminished culpability 
makes them less culpable than competent individuals are for morally reprehensible and criminal 
behavior). See generally Natalie Pifer, Note, Is Life the Same as Death?: Implications of Graham 
  
266 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:255 
coming to this conclusion, the Court focused on adolescent brain 
development, relying heavily on “medical, psychological, and 
sociological studies, as well as common experience, which all 
showed that children under 18 are less culpable and more amenable 
to rehabilitation than adults who commit similar crimes.”59 
Specifically, the Court focused on three significant differences 
between adults and juveniles that indicated that juvenile offenders, 
unlike their adult counterparts, should not be included among the 
worst criminals who deserve the death penalty.60 
First, the Court noted that the “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” often found in juveniles tend 
to result in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”61 
Second, the Court acknowledged that “juveniles are more vulnerable 
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures.”62 Third, 
the Court pointed out that “the character of a juvenile is not as well 
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are 
more transitory, less fixed.”63 
As a result, the Court reasoned that the “reality that juveniles 
still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to 
conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is 
evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”64 Thus, the imposition 
of a final and irrevocable penalty on juvenile offenders, even those 
convicted of the most heinous crimes, is inappropriate in light of 
juveniles’ lessened culpability and capacity to change.65 
Following the Court’s decision in Roper, life without parole 
sentences replaced executions for juvenile offenders. Given that both 
the death penalty and life without parole impose a “terminal, 
 
v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole Sentences for 
Juvenile and Mentally Retarded Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2010) (providing a 
thorough analysis of the relationship between criminal behavior and culpability). 
 59. Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, CRIM. L. 
REP., July 14, 2010, at 1, 2. See generally Pifer, supra note 58, at 1501 (providing a thorough 
analysis of the relationship between criminal behavior and culpability). 
 60. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 61. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 570. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 571 (explaining that penological justifications for the death penalty apply to 
children with lesser force than they do to adults in light of diminished culpability). 
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unchangeable, once-and-for-all judgment upon the whole life of a 
human being,”66 the question became: if juveniles are less culpable 
and thus less deserving of death, do the same principles mitigate 
against life without parole?67 
IV.  GRAHAM V. FLORIDA:  
THE NATURAL  
EXTENSION OF ROPER 
A.  Terrance Graham 
When Terrance Graham was sixteen years old, he and three 
other juvenile accomplices were arrested for attempted robbery of a 
restaurant that left the owner of the establishment injured.68 Graham 
was charged as an adult with one count of armed burglary with 
assault or battery (a first-degree felony with a maximum sentence of 
life in prison without the possibility of parole in Florida) and another 
count of attempted armed robbery (a second-degree felony with a 
maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison).69 
Graham pleaded guilty to both charges and made a declaration 
before the court that he was committed to turning his life around.70 
Under his plea agreement, he received time served and three years of 
probation.71 
Less than six months later, Graham was again arrested, this time 
for his alleged role in a home-invasion robbery.72 He was never 
convicted of that offense, but the court found that he had violated his 
probation.73 At the sentencing hearing, the probation department 
recommended “at most four years imprisonment,”74 Graham’s 
attorney argued for five years (the statutory minimum for his 
 
 66. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621). 
 67. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021–23 (2010) (explaining how the Court has 
handled Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty and noting that the Court has never 
considered such a categorical challenge to a term of years sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 68. Id. at 2018. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2019. 
 74. Id. 
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probation violations), and the state pressed for thirty years.75 The trial 
judge sentenced Graham to life without parole, and made the 
following remarks: 
I don’t understand why you would be given such a great 
opportunity to do something with your life and why you 
would throw it away. The only thing that I can rationalize is 
that you decided that this is how you were going to lead 
your life and that there is nothing that we can do for you.76 
Graham immediately filed an appeal that challenged the 
constitutionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment.77 The 
First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed his sentence, 
noting that he “rejected his second chance and chose to continue 
committing crimes at an escalating pace,”78 and that he was 
“incapable of rehabilitation.”79 
B.  Graham v. Florida:  
Kids Are Different? 
1.  The Holding 
Although the Florida Supreme Court denied review,80 the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether the 
Constitution, specifically the Eighth Amendment, permits a juvenile 
offender to be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide 
crime.81 On May 17, 2010, the Court ruled in a 5–4 decision that a 
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile who was convicted of a 
nonhomicide offense does, in fact, violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.82 In the central 
holding of the decision, Justice Kennedy declared: 
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide. A State need not guarantee the offender eventual 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2020 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 982 So. 2d 43, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2020–21. 
 82. Levick, supra note 59, at 664. 
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release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide 
him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release 
before the end of that term.83 
2.  The Analysis 
Prior to beginning its analysis, the Court considered which 
approach to Eighth Amendment proportionality was more 
appropriate—the categorical approach of Atkins and Roper or 
Harmelin v. Michigan’s84 “grossly disproportionate” standard.85 
Because a sentencing practice, rather than a particular defendant’s 
sentence, was at issue, the Court adopted the categorical approach.86 
The Court reasoned that Harmelin’s “threshold comparison between 
the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime”87 would do 
nothing to advance the Court’s analysis, and thus, was not 
appropriate.88 
Once the Court determined that Harmelin’s “threshold 
comparison” was inappropriate, it began its Eighth Amendment 
analysis by considering whether the punishment of life without 
parole for juveniles who are convicted of nonhomicide offenses was 
congruent with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,”89 the appropriate test for categorical 
cases.90 In doing so, the Court used a two-prong analysis, looking 
first at evidence of a strong national consensus against the sentencing 
practice, and then using its own independent judgment.91 
Under the first prong, the Court analyzed the “objective indicia 
of national consensus” as reflected in relevant state legislation and in 
the states’ actual sentencing practices.92 Although twenty-six states 
(and the District of Columbia and the federal government) had 
statutory authorization to impose life without parole for nonhomicide 
 
 83. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (emphasis added). 
 84. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 85. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 86. Id. at 2022–23. 
 87. Id. at 2023. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
 90. Id. at 2023. 
 91. Arya, supra note 2, at 113. 
 92. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
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offenses, only eleven jurisdictions actually did so.93 The Court 
concluded that this was indicative of a national consensus against the 
practice, despite the existence of legislation allowing for these 
sentences.94 
Under the second prong of the test, the Court departed 
somewhat from traditional Eighth Amendment analysis and 
considered (1) the “culpability of the offenders at issue in light of 
their crimes and characteristics”; (2) the “severity of the 
punishment”; and (3) “whether the challenged sentencing practice 
serves legitimate penological goals.”95 
Relying heavily on Roper’s findings regarding the lessened 
culpability of juveniles,96 the Court took a categorical approach to its 
evaluation of the severity of life without parole.97 Rather than 
focusing on the nature of the offense (as it had previously done in 
Eighth Amendment challenges where the death penalty was not at 
issue),98 the Court’s analysis centered on the characteristics of the 
offender (specifically age)—the same approach that it used in both 
Roper and Atkins to invalidate the death penalty for an entire class of 
offenders.99 
In evaluating the severity of the sentence, the Court recognized 
that life without parole shares certain characteristics with the death 
penalty that no other sentences share.100 Specifically, life without 
parole “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It 
deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope 
of restoration.”101 The Court also pointed out that this sentence is 
“especially harsh” for juveniles because, inevitably, a juvenile 
sentenced to life without parole will spend more time behind bars 
than his or her adult counterpart will spend.102 
 
 93. Id. at 2024. 
 94. See id. at 2025. 
 95. Id. at 2026. 
 96. See supra Part III. 
 97. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2027. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2028. 
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In examining the penological justifications for a sentence of life 
without parole, the Court concluded that the diminished culpability 
of juveniles undermines the legitimacy of deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation as justifiable goals for these sentences.103 
Specifically, with regard to incapacitation, the Court reasoned that 
“[t]o justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile 
offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to 
make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics 
of juveniles make that judgment questionable.”104 As it addressed in 
Roper, the Court has forbidden courts from making this sort of 
determination at the outset of a juvenile’s sentence. 
V.  WHAT IS CLEAR  
AFTER GRAHAM 
A.  Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole  
for Nonhomicide Crimes Must Be Given  
a “Meaningful Opportunity for Release” 
In Graham, the Court explicitly held that “[t]he Constitution 
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a 
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”105 While a state is 
not required to guarantee the eventual release of the offender, the 
imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile triggers a constitutional 
requirement that the state “provide him or her with some realistic 
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”106 In other 
words, the juvenile offender must be given “at least a shot at 
redemption.”107 Implicit in the “recognition of redemption as an 
Eighth Amendment constitutional principle” is the Court’s rejection 
of the view that “a legislative determination that entire classes of 
individuals [are] irredeemable.”108 In the relevant portion of the 
Graham decision, Justice Kennedy warned: 
Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may 
turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of 
 
 103. Id. at 2028–30. 
 104. Id. at 2029. 
 105. Id. at 2034. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Smith & Cohen, supra note 19, at 93. 
 108. Id. at 92. 
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incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth 
Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons 
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before 
adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid 
States from making the judgment at the outset that those 
offenders never will be fit to reenter society.109 
As a direct result of this ruling, the 123 individuals who were 
serving life without parole for nonhomicide crimes before the Court 
issued its opinion110 must, at a bare minimum, have been afforded a 
new sentence that allowed for a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”111 
B.  It Is Within the Province  
of the States to Interpret  
“Meaningful Opportunity for Release” 
1.  Harmelin v. Michigan: State Legislatures Have  
Broad, but Not Limitless, Sentencing Discretion 
Although the Court held that states are constitutionally required 
to give juvenile defendants who are charged with nonhomicide 
offenses “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” the Court 
also declared that “[i]t is for the State . . . to explore the means and 
mechanisms for compliance.”112 While a state-by-state approach is 
fraught with inherent difficulties,113 it is not likely that the Court will 
“establish some sort of a numerical ceiling on the length of sentences 
that could be given to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide 
crimes . . . . [Because] [t]his kind of analysis is not one that the Court 
engages in either routinely or eagerly.”114 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that sentencing is “a 
legislative function entitled to great deference.”115 It unequivocally 
stressed this point in Harmelin v. Michigan, where the Court upheld 
a life without parole sentence for an offender who was convicted of 
 
 109. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 2024. 
 111. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16. 
 112. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 113. See infra Part VI. 
 114. Stephen St. Vincent, Comment, Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 9, 13–14 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/stvincent.pdf. 
 115. Hudson, supra note 44, at 17. 
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possession of a large quantity of cocaine.116 In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Kennedy made two illustrative statements regarding 
the Court’s approach to sentencing. First, he noted that “the fixing of 
prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological 
judgment that, as a general matter, is ‘properly within the province of 
the legislatures, not courts.’”117 As such, “Reviewing courts 
should . . . grant substantial deference to the broad authority that 
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes.”118 Second, Justice Kennedy pointed out that 
the nature of this legislative determination may result in varying 
conclusions “regarding the appropriate length of prison terms for 
particular crimes.”119 As a natural corollary, he reasoned that, as a 
result, “the circumstance that a State has the most severe punishment 
for a particular crime does not by itself render the punishment . . . 
[unconstitutional].”120 
This sentiment has been echoed by commentators, such as Kent 
S. Scheidegger, the legal director of the Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation, who argues that sentencing-policy decisions (such as 
those at issue here) are “to be made by the people of the several 
states through the democratic process. Whether one agrees or 
disagrees with the decision, it is the people’s to make.”121 While this 
idea may be rooted in Supreme Court precedent, it is equally 
important to recognize that legislative deference is not without 
limitation. 
2.  The Constitution Will Always 
Constrain Legislative Discretion 
In Graham, the Court declared that “penological theory is not 
adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide 
 
 116. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991). 
 117. Id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 
(1980)). 
 118. Id. at 999 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 
 119. Id. at 1000. 
 120. Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1980)). 
 121. Hudson, supra note 44, at 17. To put Mr. Scheidegger’s comment in perspective, it is 
important to note that the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation is a group that supports crime 
victims and maintains that Roper should have never been extended. Id. This argument is based on 
the organization’s fundamental belief that the Constitution does not give the federal judiciary the 
right to tamper with state sentencing laws. Id. 
  
274 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:255 
offenders.”122 In this respect, the Court explicitly determined that the 
penological justifications that legislatures relied on in enacting these 
sentencing statutes were improper and thus undeserving of such 
deference. In other words, “the people” got it wrong. While the Court 
gives them a certain amount of deference, neither the state 
legislatures nor the state courts may contravene the Constitution as 
the Court has interpreted it. And in Graham, the Court made it quite 
clear that juvenile offenders who are charged with nonhomicide 
offenses must—at a minimum—be given a “realistic”123 and 
“meaningful”124 opportunity to obtain release, even if they have been 
sentenced to life without parole. 
VI.  WHAT IS NOT CLEAR  
AFTER GRAHAM 
A.  Kids Are Different? 
Many scholars contend that Graham has “completely altered the 
landscape of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”125 Until 
this decision, the prevailing approach was “death is different.”126 
Historically, the Court has applied the Eight Amendment to the death 
penalty with “special force” because it is the “most severe 
punishment.”127 In this way, the Court has effectively isolated death 
penalty jurisprudence from the rest of criminal procedure.128 Until 
Graham, the Court had been “reluctant to apply rules specially 
created to regulate the death penalty to noncapital [cases].”129 By 
taking a categorical rule that was developed in the context of the 
death penalty and applying it to a life without parole sentence for a 
nonhomicide case, the Court has radically departed from 
precedent.130 
 
 122. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 123. Id. at 2034. 
 124. Id. at 2030. 
 125. E.g., St. Vincent, supra note 114, at 9. 
 126. Arya, supra note 2, at 99. 
 127. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 856 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 128. St. Vincent, supra note 114, at 10. 
 129. Arya, supra note 2, at 120. 
 130. Id. at 112. 
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In banning life without parole sentences for juveniles who are 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses, the Court relied on the same 
developmental and scientific research that it used to invalidate the 
death penalty for juveniles in Roper.131 Throughout the decision, the 
Court repeatedly emphasized the reduced culpability of juvenile 
offenders when they are compared to adult offenders.132 By adopting 
this “developmentally driven”133 approach to Eighth Amendment 
analysis, the Court has arguably transitioned from a policy that 
“death is different” to a policy that “kids are different.”134 
If that is indeed the case and “kids are different,” then there is a 
strong argument for extending Graham to at least two additional 
populations: juveniles who are sentenced to “functional” life without 
parole and juveniles who are sentenced to life without parole for 
homicide offenses under felony-murder statutes and accomplice 
liability. 
B.  Who Is Entitled to a  
“Meaningful Opportunity for Release”? 
1.  Does Graham Apply to Term of Years  
Sentences That Are Materially Indistinguishable  
from Life Without Parole? 
In Graham, the Court framed the issue as “whether the 
Constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in 
prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime.”135 By expressly 
limiting the scope of the holding to life without parole, the Court 
created the opportunity for states to circumvent the decision by 
assigning a lengthy term of years sentence, which is the practical 
equivalent of life without parole.136 
Justice Alito acknowledged this limitation in his dissent in 
Graham.137 He pointed out that although the Eighth Amendment 
prevents a juvenile offender who is convicted of a nonhomicide 
 
 131. Levick, supra note 59, at 1–2. 
 132. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 567, 571. 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. St. Vincent, supra note 114, at 9–10. 
 135. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010). 
 136. St. Vincent, supra note 114, at 13–14. 
 137. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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offense from facing a sentence of life without parole, “[n]othing in 
the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of 
years without the possibility of parole.”138 
Thus, it may be possible for a state to conform to the letter of the 
law while it simultaneously violates the spirit of the decision. If, for 
instance, a state court imposed a hundred-year sentence on a juvenile 
for a particularly heinous nonhomicide offense, it seems evident that 
this sentence is, for all intents and purposes, the functional equivalent 
of life without parole. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy’s precise 
language, which expressly limits the holding to life without parole, 
has allowed for the argument that imposing a hundred-year sentence 
does not technically violate Graham because the Court’s holding is 
only triggered by the imposition of life without parole.139 
In the year following Graham, there was a significant split in the 
application of the Court’s central holding. This tension was best 
illustrated by People v. Caballero,140 People v. Mendez,141 and People 
v. Nunez,142 three California Court of Appeal cases that addressed 
whether Graham applies where a juvenile receives an extreme term 
of years sentence rather than life without parole.143 Although the 
courts agreed that Graham was not controlling,144 they ultimately 
arrived at different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the 
extreme term of years sentences at issue. 
a.  People v. Caballero 
On January 18, 2011, the Court of Appeal for the State of 
California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed a 110-
year sentence for sixteen-year-old defendant Rodrigo Caballero.145 
Relying on Graham, Caballero argued that his sentence of three 
consecutive life terms was unconstitutional because it denied him 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2034 (majority opinion). 
 140. 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 141. 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 142. 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 616 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 143. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 881–86; Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 924–26. 
 144. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882; Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 925–26. 
 145. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 920–21. Caballero was convicted of “three counts of 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, with findings that he personally and 
intentionally discharged a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury on one victim, and committed 
crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang.” Id. at 920. 
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any “meaningful” chance for release and foreclosed any opportunity 
for him to work toward good conduct and to obtain work credits to 
mitigate his sentence.146 
The court rejected this argument, concluding that Graham was 
not controlling because the holding was expressly limited to 
“juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for 
nonhomicide offenses.”147 The court reasoned that the “defendant’s 
sentence was a term of years (110) to life, not life without the 
possibility of parole, and no language in Graham suggests that the 
case applies to such a sentence.”148 Furthermore, the court determined 
that if the Supreme Court had intended to broaden the class of 
offenders within the scope of its decision, it would have stated that 
Graham also concerned juvenile offenders who receive the 
functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole for a 
nonhomicide offense.149 
b.  People v. Mendez 
On the opposite end of the spectrum was the Court of Appeal for 
the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two. On 
September 1, 2010, the court held that the eighty-four-year sentence 
that sixteen-year-old defendant Victor Mendez received 
“constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment”150 because it 
“amount[ed] to a de facto sentence of life without parole.”151 As such, 
the sentence was unconstitutional under the federal and state 
constitutions, per Graham.152 
Mendez argued that Graham applied because under his current 
sentence, he would not be eligible for parole until well past his life 
expectancy.153 Thus, his sentence amounted to a virtual, or de facto, 
 
 146. Id. at 925. 
 147. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 873 (Ct. App. 2010). Sixteen-year-old Victor 
Mendez received an eighty-four-year sentence after being convicted of one count of carjacking, 
one count of assault with a firearm, and seven counts of second degree robbery, including 
enhancements on each count. Id. 
 151. Id. at 881. 
 152. Id. at 873. 
 153. Id. at 881. 
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life without parole sentence.154 Although the court recognized that 
Mendez’s sentence was “materially indistinguishable” from life 
without parole, it did not agree that his sentence should be reversed 
pursuant to Graham.155 Citing the precise language that the Caballero 
court used to uphold the defendant’s 110-year sentence, the Mendez 
court stressed that “Graham expressly limited its holding to . . . 
‘juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a 
nonhomicide offense.’”156 Thus, because Mendez’s sentence was not 
“technically” a life without parole sentence, the holding in Graham 
did not control. 
Despite this technicality, the court determined that the principles 
that Graham set forth should be applied to Mendez.157 The court 
pointed out that Graham required that a state give a juvenile “some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”158 While the Supreme Court did not 
provide an explicit definition of “meaningful opportunity,” the 
Mendez court reasoned that “common sense dictates that a juvenile 
who is sentenced at the age of 18 and who is not eligible for parole 
until after he is expected to die does not have a meaningful, or as the 
Court also put it, ‘realistic,’ opportunity of release.”159 For Mendez, 
the imposition of an eighty-four-year sentence would guarantee his 
eventual death in prison—an outcome that is prohibited under the 
spirit of Graham. 
c.  People v. Nunez 
In People v. Nunez, the Court of Appeal for the State of 
California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, espoused a 
similar sentiment.160 There, following writ relief that invalidated the 
defendant’s life without parole sentence for his role in an aggravated 
kidnapping, the trial court imposed a sentence that required the 
defendant to serve 175 years before he qualified for a parole 
 
 154. Id. at 882. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010)). 
 157. Id. at 883. 
 158. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). 
 159. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034). 
 160. 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 616 (Ct. App. 2011). 
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hearing.161 The court concluded that this sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment as the Court 
interpreted in Graham: 
A term of years effectively denying any possibility of 
parole is no less severe than [a life without parole] term. 
Removing the [life without parole] designation does not 
confer any greater penological justification. Nor does 
tinkering with the label somehow increase a juvenile’s 
culpability. Finding a determinate sentence exceeding a 
juvenile’s life expectancy constitutional because it is not 
labeled an [life without parole] sentence is Orwellian. 
Simply put, a distinction based on changing a label, as the 
trial court did, is arbitrary and baseless.162 
The Nunez court expressed explicit agreement with the 
reasoning in Mendez163 and rejected the formalistic approach that was 
taken by Caballero164 and its progeny. Whether the Mendez or 
Caballero approach shall prevail will soon be determined by the 
California Supreme Court, which granted review in Caballero on 
April 13, 2011.165 
2.  Does Graham Apply to Juveniles  
“Who Did Not Kill or Intend to Kill” but Have  
Been Convicted of Homicide Under  
Felony-Murder Statutes or Accomplice Liability? 
a.  Felony murder and  
accomplice liability 
Felony murder “is a legal fiction that transfers intent to commit 
the underlying felony to the homicide that occurs in the course of 
that felony.”166 If charged under a felony-murder statute, an 
individual can be convicted of first-degree murder without any proof 
of premeditation, deliberateness, or willfulness because “those 
elements are presumed to exist if the state proves participation in the 
 
 161. Id. at 617. 
 162. Id. at 624. 
 163. Id. at 625. 
 164. Id. at 618 n.1. 
 165. People v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011). 
 166. Levick, supra note 59, at 3. 
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underlying felony.”167 Under section 190.2(d) of the California Penal 
Code, for example, a person who is not the actual killer but who acts 
“with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, 
aids abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists 
in the commission of a felony” that results in the death of someone 
“shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for 
life without the possibility of parole.”168 Thus, it is irrelevant that the 
individual did not physically commit the murder.169 Moreover, the 
statute does not even require that the individual had prior knowledge 
that a homicide was intended.170 
Like felony murder, accomplice liability is a theory of criminal 
liability.171 Because there is no legal distinction between being 
convicted as a principal or as an accomplice under American 
criminal law, the accomplice faces the exact same punishment as 
does the principal.172 In other words, while there may be a large 
variation in culpability between participants, the substantive law 
regarding accomplice liability does not attempt to account for this 
difference.173 For this reason, it is entirely possible that an individual 
who acts as a lookout, driver, or provider of supplies (e.g. a weapon) 
will face the same penalty that the principal actor faces.174 
b.  The relevance and  
applicability of Graham 
An overwhelming number of convictions that result in life 
without parole are predicated on either theory of criminal liability, or 
on both. According to a survey that Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International conducted, as many as 45 percent of 
respondents reported that they did not physically commit the murder 
 
 167. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 65 (2010). “Accomplice liability may also be termed 
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for which they are serving life without parole.175 In addition, it is 
estimated that between one-fourth and one-third of all juveniles who 
are currently serving life without parole in the United States were 
sentenced under felony-murder statutes for homicides that did not 
involve premeditation.176 
In Graham, the Court acknowledged that, compared to an adult 
murderer, a juvenile offender “who did not kill or intend to kill has a 
twice diminished moral culpability.”177 As such, it would seem that 
life without parole, the most severe punishment permitted by law for 
any juvenile offense after the Court’s decision in Roper,178 should be 
reserved for the “worst of the worst.” If defendants who are 
convicted under felony-murder and accomplice-liability theories lack 
a clear manifestation of an intent to kill, there now may be an 
argument against the constitutionality of life without parole as 
applied to them—at least on a case-by-case basis where the “limited 
role and reduced blameworthiness of a particular juvenile . . . 
support[s] the invalidation”179 of the sentence at issue. 
Despite the viability of this argument, lower courts have been 
reluctant to extend Graham to life without parole for homicide 
offenses, regardless of whether the conviction resulted from 
prosecution under a felony-murder statute or an accomplice-liability 
theory.180 Nonetheless, the issue has been vigorously debated. For 
instance, in Jackson v. Norris, the Arkansas Supreme Court was 
divided on whether the petitioner should be granted habeas relief 
under Graham for his involvement as an accomplice in an 
aggravated robbery that resulted in the death of the victim.181 The 
dissent contended that Graham required the court to grant relief to 
the petitioner because his conviction “was only obtained by proving 
that he was an accomplice, and his accomplice took someone’s life in 
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the course of a felony, the aggravated robbery.”182 In addition, the 
dissent noted the factual similarities between this case and 
Graham—the only significant difference being that “the victim in 
Graham did not die from [the] accomplice’s physical attack.”183 
Echoing Justice Kennedy’s language, the dissent concluded that 
because the petitioner did not kill or intend to kill the victim, 
Graham was controlling.184 
VII.  THE PAROLE BOARD:  
THE STATES’ MECHANISM FOR  
COMPLIANCE WITH GRAHAM 
A state’s parole board is an executive branch agency that 
decides, on a case-by-case basis, whether prisoners are ready to be 
released back into the community.185 The decision to release an 
offender from prison may be either discretionary or mandatory.186 If 
release is mandatory, the prisoner must be released at the expiration 
of a certain time period.187 Where release is discretionary, however, 
the decision falls within the judgment of the parole board.188 While 
Graham creates the opportunity for parole, it does not guarantee 
eventual freedom.189 As a result, state parole boards will ultimately 
decide whether individuals have demonstrated sufficient maturity 
and rehabilitation to warrant release back into the community. 
A.  Compliance in States  
That Have Abolished Parole 
The American Probation and Parole Association reports that at 
least sixteen states have either abolished parole entirely or have had 
the power of the state parole board greatly diminished.190 The state 
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parole boards that have had their power greatly diminished only have 
discretion over a small or diminishing parole-eligible population. 
Much of this reform was prompted by a “get tough on crime”191 
campaign that was launched by constituents and legislative 
representatives who felt that overall sentencing and release laws 
were too “soft” on criminals.192 
Florida, for example, abolished parole in 1983 after the early 
release of several high-profile criminals sparked public outrage.193 As 
a result of this legislative change, Florida’s Parole Commission only 
reviews cases that predate 1983.194 
Given Graham’s requirement that the states provide a 
meaningful opportunity for release to all juveniles serving life 
without parole for nonhomicide crimes, states such as Florida have 
found themselves in a difficult situation. Not only are they 
categorically barred from imposing JLWOP unless they reestablish 
parole for this particular group of offenders195 but they also need to 
establish an efficient solution for resentencing individuals who are 
currently serving these sentences. 
In Florida alone, there are seventy-seven individuals who must 
be resentenced under Graham’s ruling.196 Until legislation eliminates 
the need for resentencing hearings, “the onus falls on trial judges to 
resentence individual defendants.”197 This solution is fraught with 
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difficulties and carries with it the significant risk that juveniles across 
the country will face widely disparate sentences for identical crimes. 
B.  Compliance in States with  
Indeterminate Sentencing  
and Parole Boards 
In states that have indeterminate sentencing and functioning 
parole boards, the Graham ruling simply requires that state 
legislatures amend sentencing statutes to include the possibility of 
parole for individuals who are serving life without parole for 
nonhomicide offenses.198 Following Graham, state legislatures in 
Iowa,199 California,200 and Pennsylvania201 have introduced (or 
reintroduced) legislation that would bring their states’ sentencing 
practices into compliance with the decision. In California202 and 
Pennsylvania,203 the proposed legislation goes one step further, 
affording a meaningful opportunity for release to all juveniles who 
are sentenced to life without parole, regardless of whether they were 
convicted of a homicide or nonhomicide offense. 
1.  Iowa 
In January 2011, Iowa State Senators Wally Horn, Pam Jochum, 
and Bill Dix introduced Senate Study Bill 1058,204 which would 
establish a parole procedure for individuals who are convicted of 
nonhomicide class “A” felonies that they committed while they were 
under age eighteen.205 Under the bill, these individuals would be 
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eligible for parole after they serve a minimum term of twenty-five 
years.206 If it is enacted, this bill would grant six of the individuals in 
the nation who are directly impacted by Graham’s express holding 
(i.e., those serving life without parole for nonhomicide offenses) the 
opportunity to present their case to the parole board.207 
2.  California 
In December 2010, California State Senator Leland Y. Yee 
introduced Senate Bill 9, commonly known as SB9.208 If it is enacted, 
the bill would allow individuals who were under eighteen at the time 
of the offense for which they were sentenced to life without parole to 
submit a petition for resentencing after they serve between ten and 
twenty-five years.209 The bill requires that juvenile offenders prove to 
both a judge and a parole board that they are worthy of parole 
consideration.210 This bill would extend far beyond the four 
individuals who were sentenced to life without parole for 
nonhomicide offenses in California, reaching approximately 227 of 
the people who were sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole.211 
3.  Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, State Representative Kenyatta J. Johnson 
introduced House Bill 1999.212 If it is enacted, this bill would abolish 
life without parole sentences for juveniles and allow all individuals 
who are serving life sentences for crimes that they committed when 
they were under age eighteen the opportunity to go before a parole 
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board at age thirty-one and then every three years thereafter.213 This 
bill was first introduced on September 22, 2009,214 but 
Pennsylvania’s House Judiciary Committee did not hold its first 
hearing on the bill until August 4, 2010—after the Court decided 
Graham215 Although Pennsylvania does not currently have any 
individuals who are serving life without parole for nonhomicide 
offenses,216 this far-reaching bill would provide approximately 450 
juveniles who are currently serving life without parole the chance to 
have their case reviewed by a parole board.217 
C.  Practical Problems Remain:  
Ensuring “Meaningful” Parole Review 
While each of these legislative proposals offers individuals who 
are sentenced to JLWOP the opportunity for parole, practical 
problems remain that may frustrate their ability to obtain meaningful 
parole review. Incorporated into each bill is the notion that any 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation”218 will rely on the determination of a 
state’s parole board. From the outset, critics have questioned how 
meaningful the right to a parole hearing actually is, given that in 
many states, “parole hearings have become a sort of charade in 
which the prisoner can never actually win release, because the parole 
board routinely denies parole eligibility based solely upon the facts 
of the underlying crime, which is the one thing that the prisoner . . . 
can never change.”219 
In California, for example, suitability for parole release is 
evaluated by the parole board based on the board’s determination of 
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the “threat to public safety” posed by the offender.220 As 
contemplated above, one of the factors that is used to evaluate this 
threat is “whether the commitment offense was heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel.”221 In practice, this “catchall” factor ensures that almost no one 
who is serving a sentence for a serious and violent offense is 
released.222 Each year, only 1 percent of parole-eligible prisoners are 
released from California prisons.223 Because a vast majority of the 
states “still impose sentences terminating in discretionary parole 
release”224 and also “retain[ ] some form of discretionary parole 
release,”225 the practice of routinely denying parole release is not an 
isolated phenomenon. In fact, statistics establish that “nationwide, 
discretionary parole release has decreased as a percentage of released 
prisoners” in recent years.226 
The illusory existence of “meaningful” parole release, as 
exemplified by the current situation in California, raises the issue of 
what should be done when a state technically allows for parole but 
structures the parole system in a way that makes the opportunity for 
release virtually unattainable. Like a term of years sentence that 
operates as a functional equivalent to a life without parole sentence, 
the creation of a parole structure that provides for no “realistic” or 
“meaningful” opportunity for release, as Graham requires, would 
directly contravene the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment.227 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Graham marks a significant departure from the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by categorically barring life 
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sentences for youths who are convicted of nonhomicide crimes based 
on the unique amenability of juveniles to rehabilitation, rather than 
on the nature of the punishment itself. Despite any remaining 
uncertainty regarding to whom the decision applies and what should 
be done to overcome practical problems inhibiting state compliance, 
Graham is a game-changing victory for juveniles and juvenile-rights 
advocates alike. It would be a mistake to assume that Graham is 
inapplicable to a larger juvenile population given that all juveniles, 
even those who are convicted of the worst offenses, are cognitively, 
behaviorally, and emotionally different from adults in ways that 
make them less culpable. 
The United States has approximately 2,570 individuals serving 
life without parole for crimes that they committed when they were 
under the age of eighteen.228 Although only a very small percentage 
of those individuals will directly benefit from Graham’s holding,229 
the Court’s reasoning can and should be used to challenge life 
without parole for the other 95 percent of juveniles serving life 
without parole.230 Advocates for juveniles need to seize on Graham’s 
transformative potential and push for additional reform that, until 
recently had no solid foundation in Supreme Court precedent. 
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